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Abstract  
 Applying several matching estimators to a sample of Spanish manufacturing SMEs, 
we evaluate the impact of regional and federal funding on inbound open innovation 
strategies. Such SMEs are more likely to respond to public support by increasing either their 
cooperation with government institutions or their investment in extramural R&D than by 
enhancing cooperative networks. A policy corollary is to promote measures to attenuate 
cooperation failures. Methodologically, each type of funding and each type of cooperative 
partner should be considered separately. Moreover, overestimation of treatment effects when 
firms' unobserved characteristics are not addressed suggests that sensitivity analysis should 
complement matching estimation.  
Keywords: inbound open innovation; SMEs; evaluation of public support; sensitivity 
analysis; coordination failure  
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1 Introduction  
Evaluation of innovation policies, until recently, was mainly concerned with input and 
output additionalities, whereby input additionality occurs when firms increase their R&D 
investment as a result of receiving subsidies; and output additionality results in new patents, 
product and process innovations or increased innovative sales (a share of turnover from new 
products). Focusing on innovation inputs and outputs, however, means that we stay outside 
the “black box” of innovation processes, rather observing the beginning (innovation inputs) 
or end results (innovation outputs) of processes (OECD, 2006).  
The concept of behavioural additionality invites us to go beyond input and output 
additionality and assess the impact of public measures on firms' innovative behaviour. The 
literature on additionality lacks a common definition of behavioural additionality. Most 
empirical studies explore network additionality (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006), which 
occurs when firms expand their networks and cooperative activities as a result of 
participation in support programmes. Given that data on other types of additionality are not 
available, we follow this tradition. 
The narrow concept of behavioural additionality (i.e. network additionality) encompasses 
the impact of public funding on inbound open innovation. In 2003, open innovation emerged 
as a new conceptual framework, emphasizing the role of networking and knowledge 
exchange on firms' innovativeness, and their critical role in creating and sustaining 
competitive advantages (Chesbrough, 2003). Open innovation is the subject of an increasing 
number of empirical studies, mainly focusing on the determinants of open innovation 
strategies and their impact on innovation and firm performance (for a comprehensive review, 
see  Schroll and Mild, 2012).  
Evaluation of public support should take into account endogeneity and consequent 
selection bias arising from two sources: self-selection of programme participants; and 
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selection of potentially successful applicants by government agencies (Busom and 
Fernandez-Ribas, 2008). Due to often noted factors hampering econometric analysis (such as, 
lack of longitudinal data and of valid instruments for selection models),
1
 matching estimation 
has become a widely used evaluation method in the literature on the effectiveness of 
innovation policy. Drawing on Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006 data, we employed 
several matching estimators to investigate the impact of public support on open innovation 
practices in Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
Our study contributes to the evaluation literature by providing the first empirical findings 
on the impact of public innovation support on cooperative behaviour in SMEs (behavioural 
additionality), and on two additional inbound open innovation practices: outsourcing R&D; 
and acquiring other external knowledge (e.g. patents and know-how). The treatment effects 
are reported for two separate sources of funding: regional and national support programmes. 
Following the literature on the determinants of R&D cooperation, we explicitly take into 
account incoming spillovers, knowledge flows from different sources (suppliers, customers, 
competitors, government and Higher Education Institutions) and include barriers to 
innovation and to cooperation in our methodological framework. Finally, particular features 
of this study are the conduct of sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of unobserved 
heterogeneity on the estimated effects of public support programmes; and, moreover, that the 
conclusions of this study take into account the evidence and implications of unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the concepts of open innovation, 
while Section 3 formulates the methodological framework, discusses model specification and 
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 These limiting factors are noted in most studies on the additionality of public support (see, for instance, 
Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2008; Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2011). 
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data used in the study. Section 4 gives the main results from matching and discusses the 
evidence and implications of sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 Open innovation  
The significance of cooperation in firms' innovation activities is reinforced with the 
concept of open innovation. With the advent of Chesbrough's (2003) seminal work, open 
innovation emerged as a new conceptual framework in innovation literature, in distinction to 
closed innovation systems (Lichtenthaler, 2011). This new paradigm acknowledges firms' 
limited internal innovative capacities and suggests that generating external knowledge is 
necessary for innovation processes, as firms no longer can be successful innovators by 
relying solely on internal capabilities.  
Open innovation is defined as "the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation, and to expand the markets for external use of innovation, 
respectively" (Chesbrough et al., 2006, p. 1). Knowledge flows aiming at fostering internal 
innovation are termed inbound open innovation (technology exploration or acquisition), 
while market expansion focusing on the commercialisation phase of the innovation process is 
termed outbound open innovation (technology exploitation or commercialization) (Dahlander 
and Gann, 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2011; Van de Vrande et al., 2009).
2
 The process of 
technology exploration or acquisition (i.e. inbound open innovation) encompasses the 
following practices (Parida et al., 2012; Van de Vrande et al., 2009):
3
 
                                                          
2
 Inbound open innovation is also referred to as the outside-in process of open innovation, whereas outbound 
open innovation is referred to as the inside-out process of open innovation (Enkel et al., 2009). 
3
 Dahlander and Gann (2010) divided inbound and outbound open innovation practices into  two categories - 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary - whereby revealing and selling are non-pecuniary and pecuniary outbound 
innovation respectively, and sourcing and acquiring are non-pecuniary and pecuniary inbound innovation 
respectively.  
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- Technology scouting, that is, a process of gathering information and knowledge from 
the technological environment (Cohen and Levithal, 1990; Dahlander and Gann, 
2010; Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler, 2009). 
- Customer involvement: Customers can be involved in firms' internal innovation 
processes, which enables firms to develop new products or to modify the existing 
ones according to customers' needs and preferences.    
- External networking: Networking on innovation is an important component of open 
innovation, and it encompasses both formal (e.g. R&D alliances) and informal 
cooperation on innovation with individuals and organisations (e.g. suppliers).  
- External participation: This form of open innovation is associated with equity 
investment in other companies in order to access their knowledge or to benefit from 
other synergies.   
- Outsourcing R&D: Extramural R&D activities performed by other firms or private 
and public organizations are an important alternative to intramural R&D.  
- Inward IP licensing (licensing-in): Firms can benefit from external knowledge 
through purchasing patents, trademarks, copyrights and other forms of IPs (Dahlander 
and Gann, 2010). 
The process of technology exploitation or commercialization (i.e. outbound open 
innovation) includes several strategies: 
- Venturing: In the context of open innovation, venturing refers to spin-offs, i.e. 
establishing new firms based on a firm's internal knowledge. 
- Outward licensing of Intellectual Property (IP)(licensing-out): This practice allows 
companies to generate profit from selling IPs to other companies (Dahlander and 
Gann, 2010; Lichtenthaler, 2011). 
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Open innovation practices are the subject of an increasing number of empirical studies 
over the last few years. The main research objectives are aimed at identifying the 
determinants of inbound and outbound open innovation strategies, and assessing their impact 
on firms' innovation performance (for a comprehensive review of empirical studies, see 
Schroll and Mild, 2012).  
Both large firms and SMEs can greatly benefit from external knowledge. For instance, 
Soh (2003) found that repeated partnerships with other firms are positively associated with 
new product performance. Open innovation is particularly relevant to SMEs, because limited 
human and financial resources are critical barriers to internal innovation in those firms 
(Parida et al., 2012; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Yet, limited resources can also have a 
detrimental effect on open innovation in SMEs, for instance, in acquiring extramural R&D or 
maintaining collaborative networks (Huizingh, 2011). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests 
that large firms engage in open innovation to a larger extent than SMEs (Bianchi et al., 2011; 
Lihtenthaler, 2008) and, within SMEs, medium-sized firms are more prone to opening up 
innovation processes than are small firms (Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Furthermore, Van de 
Vrande et al. (2009) find that SMEs mostly engage in user innovation (customer 
involvement) and in external networking. Larson (1991) notes that establishing and 
maintaining network partnerships is critical to entrepreneurial firms' survival and success. 
Conversely, the least practiced open innovations are outward and inward IP licensing, 
venturing and external participation, which require substantial financial resources, unlike 
customer involvement and external networking, which are often informal and need not entail 
significant financial investment.  
Firms' strategic decisions on whether to develop new technologies and innovations by 
increasing in-house R&D or by external knowledge acquisition, depend on the type of 
technology. Innovation processes than involve generic (standardized) technological 
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competences, should be developed by external knowledge exploitation either through 
cooperation or subcontracting (Narula, 2001). However, core technological competencies, 
which are the main source of firms' competitive advantage, should be developed internally. 
Furthermore, in discriminating between cooperation and R&D subcontracting, following the 
argument advanced in transaction costs economics, firms have incentive to opt for the latter 
when opportunism and free riding are more likely to occur, thus increasing transaction costs 
(Dhont-Petrault and Pfister, 2011). If we assume that opportunistic behaviour decreases with 
the increase in the level of technology standardization, this would mean that R&D 
subcontracting is more suitable for developing or enhancing standardized technologies (the 
'standardization' hypothesis). Moreover, standardized technologies usually lack a degree of 
novelty sufficient to be patentable, thus suggesting that appropriability issues are less likely 
to occur.   
Conversely, due to potential cooperation failure, firms can opt for R&D subcontracting 
for developing strategic, core technologies (the 'incentive' hypothesis). Cooperation failure 
refers to reduced R&D effort in cooperative partnerships when cooperating firms do not 
clearly specify which partner will be assigned the exclusive property rights (Dhont-Petrault 
and Pfister, 2011). For instance, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) report a negative 
relationship between vertical cooperation and the effectiveness of appropriation methods. 
Moreover, Leiponen and Byma (2009) argue that small firms with close links to cooperative 
partners might face difficulties in protecting their returns to innovation. Unlike large firms, 
small firms utilize formal methods of protecting IPs (such as patenting) to a lesser extent, and 
rely more on informal methods such as secrecy and lead time (Leiponen and Byma, 2009). 
Therefore, to assure the maximum level of R&D effort, firms can assign exclusive property 
rights to the subcontractors, thus avoiding appropriability issues. 
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Finally, assessing the impact of public support on open innovation strategies is closely 
related to the concept of behavioural additionality (BA). While input and output additionality 
leave the black-box of innovation process unopened, BA goes beyond innovation inputs and 
outputs and aims at explaining what is happening inside the box. It is associated with 
intermediate effects of public support on firms' innovative behaviour (Georghiou and 
Clarysse, 2006). Following Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008), BA assesses the short-term 
impact of public programmes. Although the literature advances a broad perspective on BA, 
most empirical studies investigate only one segment of BA; that is the impact of public 
intervention on firms' cooperative behaviour (scope additionality as defined by Falk, 2007; or 
network additionality following the OECD, 2006, definition).
4
 This narrow concept of BA 
encompasses the impact of public funding on inbound open innovation, specifically the effect 
on external networking. As previous studies do not investigate other forms of behavioural 
additionality, this inquiry, unlike other studies, expands research beyond cooperative 
networking to include two additional inbound open innovation strategies: outsourcing R&D; 
and acquisition of other external knowledge.    
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Matching estimators  
The main advantage of matching estimators, compared to selection models and IV 
approaches, is that they do not require any distributional assumptions regarding the error 
terms in the selection equation and in the outcome equation. However, matching estimators 
control only for firms' observed characteristics. In cases when unobserved characteristics of 
firms influence treatment assignment, matching yields biased estimates of treatment effects.  
                                                          
4
 Our study suffers from the same limitation; available data do not allow for exploring other categories of 
behavioural additionality.  
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The crucial step in the matching procedure is the choice of covariates, denoted X. The 
literature suggests that all observed variables that simultaneously affect a treatment and 
outcome should be included in the estimation of propensity scores (the selection equation) 
(Austin, 2011; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Ho et al., 2007; Steiner et al., 2010). The next 
step in the propensity score matching is the estimation of the propensity score. Since the 
propensity score is a probability of receiving a treatment (in our case, public subsidies), 
researchers can choose any discrete choice model, because both probit and logit models tend 
to yield comparable results (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
For the sake of brevity, we will not review a full range of matching estimators, but 
instead will focus on those applied in our study (for a review of matching estimators, see 
Austin, 2011; Imbens, 2004; Morgan and Harding, 2006; Stuart, 2010). Nearest Neighbour 
(NN) matching is the most commonly used matching estimator in innovation literature 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007). The propensity score can be used to construct matched pairs by 
applying three methods (Guo and Fraser, 2010): i) nearest matching on the estimated 
propensity score; ii) Mahalanobis metric matching including the estimated propensity score 
with other matching variables;
5
 and iii) nearest Mahalanobis metric matching with calipers 
based on the propensity score. The third method is superior to others with respect to 
balancing of the covariates between a treatment and comparison group (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985). In choosing the optimal caliper size, Cochran and Rubin (1973) note that 98% 
of the bias on a normally distributed covariate is removed with the caliper of 0.2 of the 
standard deviation of the estimated covariate (in the case of PSM, the caliper is based on the 
estimated propensity score).  
The purpose of matching estimators is to balance observed covariates X between treated 
and untreated units. As discussed, nearest Mahalanobis metric matching with caliper based on 
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 This matching method is termed hybrid matching (Czarnitzki et al., 2011).  
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the propensity score results in the best balancing quality and, for that reason, we apply this 
estimator. Matching arguments, besides the estimated propensity score, are binary indicators 
for small firms and industries. The inclusion of additional matching arguments is motivated 
by the arguments advanced in the literature on SME innovation, whereby SMEs are a 
heterogeneous group of firms and their innovative activities should be analysed at industry 
level (Nooteboom, 1994; for the same empirical strategy see Czarnitzki et al., 2007; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Spithoven et al., 2012).  
After the estimation of the propensity score, but prior to applying a chosen matching 
estimator, a balancing test should be conducted. The purpose of a balancing test before 
matching (stratification test) is to check how well the estimated propensity score has 
succeeded in balancing covariates.
6
 This approach requires the division of the sample into 
strata conditional on the propensity score, and checking whether there are no statistically 
significant differences between the means of the propensity scores of the treated and non-
treated firms within each stratum. If the difference in means is statistically insignificant, then 
covariates are well balanced between matched pairs (Austin, 2011; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008; Lee 2013; Stuart, 2010).  
The literature identifies several approaches for assessing the matching quality after 
matching. The first approach consists of comparing the standardized bias before and after 
matching. The rule- of- thumb adopted in most empirical studies is that a standardized bias 
below 3% or 5% is acceptable (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The second approach is based 
on the t-test statistics, whereby we check whether there are statistically significant differences 
in the means of covariates X between treated and non-treated firms after the matching. 
Significant differences after matching imply low matching quality. Finally, the matching 
quality can be assessed by checking the joint significance of all covariates in the selection 
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 Balancing tests before matching should not be confused with balancing tests after matching.  
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equation based on the likelihood-ratio (LR) test. All variables should be jointly significant 
before matching and jointly insignificant after matching. Furthermore, one can estimate the 
propensity score only for matched treated and non-treated firms and compare the pseudo- R
2
 
before and after matching. Low pseudo-R
2
 after matching indicates a good matching quality 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Sianesi, 2004).  
For a robustness check, we use two matching estimators. The first is kernel matching, 
whereby weighted averages of most units in the control group are used to estimate a 
counterfactual outcome.
7
 The major advantage of this non-parametric estimator is the 
reduction in variance as the entire sample of the control group is used in the matching 
algorithm.  
The second estimator is Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW), which uses 
weights based on the propensity score to create an artificial population in which treatment 
assignment is independent of the exogenous covariates X. The purpose of weighting is similar 
to using survey sampling weights to obtain weighted survey samples that are representative 
of a population (Austin, 2011). The variance estimation of the IPTW estimator has to take 
into account that weights are used to create an artificial sample. It is a common practice to 
use robust variance estimation (Austin, 2011; Emsley et al., 2008).  
3.2 Model specification  
Available data allows us to explore how public support affects several inbound open 
innovation strategies: customer involvement (cooperation with customers); external 
networking [i.e. aggregate cooperation as well as cooperation with suppliers, competitors, 
consultants, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs; e.g. universities and polytechnics) and 
government institutions]; outsourcing R&D; and acquisition of other external knowledge. As 
the CIS data do not contain information on outbound open innovation, we are not able to 
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 How many comparison units will be used depends on the choice of bandwidth.  
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assess the effectiveness of public support on those open innovation practices. Further, we 
separately analyse receipt of local/regional support (FUNLOC) and of national support 
(FUNGMT).
8
  
Outcome variables are defined as follows (see Table A.1 for variable definitions and 
descriptive statistics): 
- Aggregate cooperation (COOPERATION): DV=1 if firms cooperate with any partner: 
consumers, suppliers, universities or other higher education institutions (HEIs), 
consultants, government or competitors; otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with consumers (COOP_CUSTOMERS): DV=1  if firms cooperate with 
clients or customers, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with suppliers (COOP_SUPPLIERS): DV=1  if firms cooperate with 
suppliers, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with competitors (COOP_COMPETITORS):9 DV=1  if firms cooperate 
with competitors or other firms in the sector, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with consultants (COOP_CONSULTANTS): DV=1 if firms cooperate 
with consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with HEIs (COOP_HEI): DV=1  if firms cooperate with universities or 
other higher education institutions, otherwise zero; 
- Cooperation with government (COOP_GOVERNMENT): DV=1  if firms cooperate 
with government or public research institutes, otherwise zero. 
- Outsourcing R&D (OUTSOURCING_RD): DV=1 if firms conduct extramural R&D 
activities, otherwise zero; 
                                                          
8
 For the sake of brevity, in further text we use the term regional support, but this refers to either local or 
regional public funding.    
9
 Cooperation with competitors is termed horizontal cooperation (Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2008) or co-
opetition networks (Lechner et al., 2006). 
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- Acquisition of other external knowledge (EXTERNAL_KNOWLEDGE): DV=1 if 
firms purchase or license patents, know-how, and other types of knowledge from 
other firms, otherwise zero. 
Although our sample is restricted to SMEs, we further include a dummy variable for 
small firms (SM) with more than 10 and fewer than 50 employees. SMEs are a heterogeneous 
category, and public support could have a differential effect on small firms relative to 
medium-sized firms (Curran, 2000).  
A novelty of the study is the inclusion of barriers to innovation in the estimation of 
propensity scores (Becker and Dietz, 2004). The correlation matrix between seven variables 
measuring barriers to innovation indicates that multicollinearity might exist between these 
constraining factors.
10
 Thus, to avoid multicollinearity, we omit four and include three 
variables: too high innovation costs (BARRIER3); a lack of qualified personnel (BARRIER4) 
and difficulties in finding cooperative partners (BARRIER7) (the variables measured as 
scores: 0 - no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 - medium importance; and 3 - high 
importance). The resource-based theory of the firm posits that resources are a crucial 
determinant of firms' competitive advantages (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). For SMEs, 
limited human and financial resources are critical factors in hampering innovation activities 
(Hewitt-Dundas, 2006; Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2009), and justifies the inclusion of the 
aforementioned barriers to innovation. In addition, limited internal resources and 
competencies can, at least partially, be compensated through cooperation with network 
partners (Lee et al., 2010; Parida et al., 2012).   
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 Seven barriers are as follows: lack of funds within enterprise or group; lack of finance from sources outside a 
firm; innovation costs too high; lack of qualified personnel; lack of information on technology; lack of 
information on markets; and, difficulty in finding cooperation partners for innovation.  
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The following variables are included to control for firms' absorptive capacity: patent 
activities (PROPAT); and whether firms continuously innovate (CONTINUOUS_RD). The 
reason to model these variables is that public agencies could adopt a strategy of picking the 
winners (Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Spithoven et al., 2012). In that case, government selects 
those firms that have a record of successful innovation.    
Our model also includes a dummy variable for belonging to a group (GP). This variable 
can capture a twofold effect; a directly positive effect on cooperation, as firms that are a part 
of the enterprise group could be more likely to cooperate with other firms within a group 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007); and/or, an indirect effect via an adverse effect on the probability of 
receiving support. Some support measures are restrictive insofar as SMEs that are part of a 
group are not eligible to apply. Thus, belonging to a group can be a barrier to participation in 
support programmes (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003).    
We model exporting activities (EXPORT) as a binary indicator equal to one if firms 
export and zero otherwise. Exporting can have a positive impact on cooperation, given that 
exporters potentially have a larger and/or more diverse network of cooperation partners than 
do non-exporting firms. Furthermore, exporting firms might have more incentive to innovate 
as a result of competitive pressure on international markets (Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 
2008; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2013).  
Another novelty of our study is the inclusion of sources of information in the selection 
equation. Following the literature on determinants of R&D cooperation (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2002; Chun and Mun, 2012), we model incoming spillovers proxied by the 
importance of various sources of information, such as: (a) conferences, trade fairs and 
exhibitions (INCOMING1); (b) scientific journals and publications (INCOMING2) and (c) 
professional and industry associations (INCOMING3). Furthermore, we include: 
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 Internal source of information, to measure the importance of information within a 
firm or enterprise group (INFO_INTERNAL); 
 Market sources of information: from customers (INFO_CUSTOMERS), from 
suppliers (INFO_SUPPLIERS), competitors (INFO_COMPETITORS) and 
consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes (INFO_CONSULTANTS); and 
 Institutional sources: from universities (INFO_HEI) and from government or public 
research institutes (INFO_GOVERNMENT);  
All variables are measured as scores (0 - no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 - medium 
importance; and 3 - high importance).  
In addition, the balancing test before matching reported that two variables 
(INFO_INTERNAL and INFO_SUPPLIERS) were not balanced in the propensity score model 
where the treatment variable is government support (FUNGMT). Following the literature on 
matching estimators discussed in Section 3.1, if the propensity score model is not balanced 
before matching, it should be re-specified by adding interaction terms and/or polynomials. 
We added two covariates (INTERNAL_SM and SUPPLIERS_SM), created as interaction 
terms between a binary indicator for small firms and the two unbalanced covariates 
(INFO_INTERNAL and INFO_SUPPLIERS). After these additional covariates were added to 
the propensity score model, covariate balance before matching was achieved. We used this 
specification of the propensity score model for each treatment variable, which will enable us 
to compare the treatment effects of both sources of funding.  
To control for industry heterogeneity, based on the NACE classification at the 2-digit 
industry level, we include sectoral dummy variables for each of the fourteen manufacturing 
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industries (see Table 1 for variable definition).
11
 The base category is INDUSTRY9 (sector 25 
- Manufacture of rubber and plastic products). 
3.3 Data  
Our study employs Spanish CIS2006 survey data covering the period 2004-2006.
12
 The 
sample consists of 8,022 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in manufacturing 
sectors, from which 5,115 are small and 2,907 are medium-sized firms.
13
 Around a quarter of 
the sample participated in regional programmes (1,854 SMEs or 23.1 per cent) and less than 
20 per cent received federal government support (1,312 firms or 16.4 per cent). Furthermore, 
534 firms (6.7 per cent) received both regional and government support.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table A.1 (see Appendix A). Only one-fifth of 
SMEs cooperate on innovation (22.2 per cent).
14
 Regarding cooperation partners, the largest 
number of firms cooperate with suppliers (10.7 per cent) followed by government institutions 
(8.8 per cent) and universities (7.0 per cent). The smallest numbers of firms engage in 
                                                          
11
 There are two discrepancies between the NACE two-digit classification and the CIS anonymised microdata. 
Firstly, sector 31 - Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus is a medium-high tech sector, but it is 
aggregated with three high-tech sectors: 30 - Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; 32 -
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment; and 33 - Manufacture of medical, precision 
and optical instruments. Secondly, sector 23 - Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear 
fuel is a medium low tech sector but is aggregated with sector 24 - Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products, which is a medium high tech industry.  
12
 Anonymised data in a micro-aggregated form are provided by Eurostat. Several studies use anonymised 
micro-data: for instance, Mohnen and Hoareau (2003) from the second wave of the CIS; and Grimpe and Sofka 
(2008) from the third wave of the CIS. Spithoven et al. (2012) use anonymised micro-data from the third CIS 
wave to analyse five EU countries. In addition, the authors compare the empirical results for Belgium from 
both the original and the anonymized data and report that 'the results showed very similar parameter 
estimates' (p. 69). 
13
 Small firms are defined as those employing more than 10 and less than 50 workers, while medium-sized 
firms employee between 50 and 250 workers. 
14
 We refer to inter-organizational cooperation for improving firms' innovative capabilities (Faems et al., 2005).  
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horizontal cooperation with competitors (3.6 per cent). With respect to innovation activities, 
only 11.3 per cent applied for a patent in the period covered by the survey, while 34.5 per 
cent of firms continuously engage in R&D activities, and one-fourth of SMEs undertook 
extramural R&D activities (24.7 per cent). Furthermore, a large number of SMEs are 
exporters (68.6 per cent). Among various sources of information, the most important are 
internal sources (mean value of 2.1), followed by customers and suppliers (mean values of 
1.4 and 1.5 respectively). The least important source of information is from government and 
public research institutes (mean value of 0.4). 
Table A.2 (see Appendix A) presents numbers and percentages of SMEs according to 
their cooperative behaviour and participation in support programmes. Out of 8,022 firms, 
more than two-thirds of firms neither cooperate on innovation nor participate in support 
programmes (63.5 per cent of firms from the perspective of regional support; and 67.6 per 
cent of firms from that of government support). By contrast, the percentage of firms that both 
cooperate and participate in public funding is rather low (with 8.9 per cent receiving 
local/regional support; and 6.1 per cent receiving national support). A similar pattern is found 
for participating firms that undertake extramural R&D activities (10.1 per cent participating 
in regional support measures; and 7.1 per cent receiving federal government support). Only a 
very modest share of participating firms acquires other types of external knowledge (0.8 per 
cent of those participating in regional funding; and 0.7 per cent receiving national support).  
 
4 Results and discussion  
4.1 Treatment effects  
 
We estimated the impact of public support on various types of cooperation (vertical, 
horizontal, and private-public partnerships etc.), as well as on two additional open innovation 
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practices: outsourcing R&D; and acquisition of other external knowledge.
15
 Our objective is 
to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), which indicates the 
difference in outcomes of the treated firms with and without treatment (the counterfactual 
outcome). The choice of three matching estimators is motivated by suggestions advanced in 
the literature on matching. We estimated the Nearest Neighbour (NN) matching with the 
Mahalanobis metric and a caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the propensity score, 
because, as discussed in Section 3.1, this estimator results in the best covariate balance after 
matching (D'Agostino, 1998; Cochran and Rubin, 1973). However, in our study, the number 
of matching arguments in the Mahalanobis metric amounted to eleven, which could be the 
reason why the matching balance was worse than found after kernel matching (Stuart and 
Rubin, 2008).
16
 For robustness checks, we applied two additional matching estimators: kernel 
matching; and the IPWT estimator. 
Table 1 presents the estimated Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) for three 
sources of funding.
17
 With respect to behavioural additionality, the overall results strongly 
indicate a positive but differential impact of public support for each source of funding. 
Although estimated ATT effects are fairly consistent across the three matching estimators, we 
will interpret the results from kernel matching, because the latter resulted in the best balance 
                                                          
15
 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimated coefficients and marginal effects from the probit 
models. However, they are available upon request. The purpose of the probit models is to estimate propensity 
scores, and even those variables that are statistically insignificant should remain in the model, if we suspect 
that they might affect the outcome variables. The critical step is to check the balancing property after the 
estimation of the probit models.  
16
 NN matching with the Mahalanobis metric might result in a lower matching quality if the number of 
matching arguments is larger than eight or the covariates are not normally distributed. 
17
 The ATT effects are estimated in the region of common support, as discussed in Section 4.1. Very few 
observations are lost due to the common support restriction, and this indicates a large overlap of estimated 
propensity scores among participating and non-participating SMEs. Regions of common support are not 
reported, but are available upon request.  
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after matching for each source of funding. The results of the balancing tests are reported in 
Table 2 below. The ATT effect of regional programmes on aggregate cooperation is 14.1 
percentage points (p.p.) of an increase in the probability of cooperating; and of national 
programmes 8.5 percentage points. 
A comparison between treatment effects of regional and government support reveals that 
participation in regional programmes has a larger effect on most types of cooperation than 
does participation in national programmes; the exceptions are cooperation with competitors 
(horizontal cooperation) and cooperation with HEIs. Moreover, the largest ATT effect is 
found for cooperation with government institutions for both sources of funding (for regional 
programmes, 11.8 p.p. increase in the probability of cooperating with government 
institutions; and for national support, 8.4 p.p. increase). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
On the other hand, the smallest ATT effect of regional support is reported for 
cooperation with competitors (2.7 p.p. increase of the probability of cooperating with 
competitors), and of national support for vertical cooperation (2.9 p.p. increase in the 
probability of cooperating with customers and 2.6 p.p. increase in the probability of 
cooperating with suppliers) together with cooperation with consultants (2.8 p.p. increase in 
the probability of cooperating with consultants).  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Turning to open innovation strategies other than cooperation, the most emergent 
finding is reported for outsourcing R&D. Participation in both regional and government 
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support programmes results in a larger effect on extramural R&D activities than on either the 
aggregated or the disaggregated categories of cooperation. In contrast, receiving public 
support from regional programmes has no effect on the acquisition of external knowledge, 
and for SMEs participating in government programmes only a very small effect (1.2 p.p. 
increase in the probability of acquiring other external knowledge).  
4.2 Sensitivity analysis   
 
As discussed in Section 3.1, the main drawback of matching as an evaluation method is 
that it controls only for selection on observables. Firms' innovative behaviour as well as the 
selection process can be affected by unobserved characteristics, such as managerial attitude 
toward innovation (Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2008). This unobserved heterogeneity is 
referred to in evaluation literature as hidden bias. The presence of hidden bias indicates a 
failure of the identifying assumption on unconfoundedness or the selection on observables 
(the conditional independence assumption - CIA).
18
 
The evaluation literature proposes several tests for the presence of hidden bias. The 
results of these tests should be taken with caution, as they cannot directly confirm whether 
the CIA holds; rather, they can indicate whether hidden bias arises or not. However, testing 
for unobserved heterogeneity should always complement a propensity score analysis, as the 
assumption on unconfoundedness cannot be tested directly (Guo and Fraser, 2010). Naturally, 
the ideal robustness check would be to apply those evaluation methods that control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, as discussed in the introductory section, the lack of 
valid instruments precludes this empirical strategy.  
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 The assumption of unconfoundedness refers to the condition that potential outcomes are independent of a 
treatment assignment, conditional on the observed covariates X, which are not affected by treatment (pre-
treatment variables). 
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Sensitivity analysis is not common in empirical studies on the additionality of innovation 
policy. No study on behavioural additionality reports any type of sensitivity analysis.  
Moreover, to our knowledge, only the study on input additionality by Alecke et al. (2011) 
reports the results of sensitivity analysis.
19
 The authors adopted the same Rosenbaum bound 
approach as in our study (Rosenbaum, 2002). The idea behind the Rosenbaum bounds 
approach is to determine how large the impact of an unobserved variable has to be to render 
the treatment effect statistically insignificant, under the assumption that this variable 
simultaneously affects both treatment assignment and the outcome variable (DiPrete and 
Gangl, 2004).  
Values of gamma (Γ) show the magnitude of the factor by which unobserved 
heterogeneity may cause matched pairs to differ in their odds of treatment assignment. When 
gamma has a value of 1, the treatment effect is free of hidden bias. If unobserved 
characteristics have no influence on the causal inference, then again Γ=1 and estimated ATT 
effects and associated confidence intervals are unbiased (Li, 2012). Higher values of gamma 
indicate a departure from random assignment (selection) on observables.
20
 
Table 3 reports the results of a sensitivity analysis of the main empirical results. Because 
our approach to sensitivity analysis cannot be applied to the kernel matching estimator, we 
begin by estimating the ATT effects from NN matching without replacement and with a 
caliper of 0.2 of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score. Besides the ATT 
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 However, we believe that the authors did not correctly apply the test. The user-written command for Stata, 
mhbounds, can only be used for two types of matching estimators: NN matching without replacement; and 
stratification. Alecke et al. (2011) employ kernel matching. To our understanding, mhbounds cannot be applied 
to kernel matching.  
20
 For instance, if gamma is equal to two, treated units are twice as likely to receive treatment as untreated 
(control) units. Furthermore, causal inference is sensitive to hidden bias for large gamma. Keele (2010) notes 
that using gamma between 1 and 2 is sufficient for sensitivity analysis, as for larger values of gamma most 
treatment effects are not robust to hidden bias. 
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effects estimated by applying NN matching without replacement, the table reports those 
gamma values for which the 5% significance levels of the upper bounds indicate whether 
results are sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity. The null hypothesis is no treatment effect 
(columns titled Hidden bias at 5 %); that is, an unobserved covariate renders the ATT 
insignificant. The implication of a non-rejection of the null means that the reported ATT 
effect is spurious, as it does not take into account variations in unobservables. For positive 
treatment effects, we are interested in the upper bounds indicating a possible overestimation 
of the true treatment effects
 
(Becker and Caliendo, 2007).
21
  
Unfortunately, the literature on sensitivity analysis does not provide clear guidance as to 
which value of gamma should be taken as a threshold for concluding whether or not a study 
is robust to hidden bias. Based on the proposal advanced by DiPrete and Gangl (2004), that a 
critical value of gamma depends on the research question, Lee and Lee (2009, p. 103) argue 
as follows their labour market study: "If more track records for the sensitivity parameters are 
established in future through more applications so that researchers can agree on how big is 
big for sensitivity analysis parameters, then the sensitivity analysis may become useful tools 
in dealing with unobserved confounders." Given that only one study in the literature on R&D 
and innovation policy includes a sensitivity analysis (that of Alecke et al., 2012),
22
 we 
consulted empirical studies in labour market economics (Aakvik, 2001; Caliendo et at., 2005; 
Hujer et al., 2004) and adopt the recommended threshold of Γ=1.5. Therefore, if the 
significance level is below a p-value of 5% for Γ≤1.5, we report that a model is sensitive to 
unobserved heterogeneity. Conversely, if the significance level is above 5% for Γ>1.5, we 
conclude that the model is robust to hidden bias. In the analysis, we set the maximum value 
for Γ to 2 with increments of 0.05.  
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 The null hypothesis of underestimated effects is rejected at the 1 % significance level in most cases.   
22
 The threshold in their study is Γ=3.  
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Sensitivity analysis reveals that most of the estimated treatment effects are sensitive to 
hidden biases. Analysing each source of funding separately, the Rosenbaum bound approach 
suggests the following: 
 In the case of regional support, the models that are less sensitive to unobserved 
heterogeneity are those with the following outcome variables: aggregate cooperation; 
cooperation with government (the least likely to be affected by hidden bias); and 
outsourcing R&D. The remaining models are rather sensitive to selection bias.  
 In the case of national treatment assignment, deviations from the underlying 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) are less likely to occur in the models with 
horizontal cooperation and with public institutions. For the remaining models, 
Rosenbaum's bounds indicate that ATT effects are sensitive to hidden bias.  
It is important to note that the results from a sensitivity analysis adopting the Rosenbaum 
bounds are the worst-case scenarios (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004). For instance, in the model 
with cooperation with suppliers (for regional support), the estimated ATT effect is sensitive 
to hidden selection bias for Γ≥1.25. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no 
true positive effect of public support on cooperation with suppliers. The result suggests that, 
if there were to be a confounding variable with a large effect on both treatment assignment 
and the outcome variable and if that variable were to increase the odds ratio of receiving a 
treatment for participating firms by 25 per cent (i.e. Γ=1.25) then the confidence interval for 
the ATT effect would include zero (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004).  
The overall conclusion from sensitivity analysis suggests that hidden bias is unlikely to 
occur only in the case of cooperation with government agencies; and, to a lesser extent, in 
models of aggregate cooperation (regional support); cooperation with customers (borderline 
for regional support), cooperation with competitors (government support); and the 
outsourcing of R&D (regional support and borderline for government support). On the other 
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side, hidden bias is most likely to arise in modelling cooperation with suppliers, consultants 
and Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). Finally, the models in which the outcome variable 
is the acquisition of external knowledge are least robust to unobserved heterogeneity, as 
hidden bias arises even at gamma equal to 1.  
Our findings raise several issues. First, sensitivity analysis should be a necessary step 
when the effectiveness of R&D and innovation policy is assessed with the PSM analysis, as 
the findings indicate that treatment effects could be overestimated when firms' unobserved 
characteristics are not controlled for. Although a sensitivity analysis is considered to be an 
integral part of the PSM analysis (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Guo and Fraser, 2010), it is 
not adopted as a common practice in empirical innovation studies. However, a lack of 
sensitivity analysis is not only pertinent to innovation studies; Pearl (2009) points out that 
researchers often assume that the assumption of strong ignorability (i.e. CIA) holds because a 
large number of covariates is included in estimating a propensity score. However, it is not 
enough to recognize the major limitation of the PSM analysis; we should also examine 
whether selection on observables is likely to be satisfied. Although a sensitivity analysis 
cannot directly test the assumption, it can gauge the level of robustness of empirical findings 
to hidden bias. 
Second, given the dominance of matching estimators in empirical studies, empirical 
evidence should be treated with caution. Most empirical studies reviewed in Section 3 report 
a positive impact of public support on firms' cooperation for innovation. Our results suggest 
that, depending on the type of cooperative partners, particular treatment effects could be 
overestimated: with respect to regional support, these are the estimates for cooperation with 
customers (on the borderline of our threshold), with suppliers, with competitors, with 
consultants and with HEIs as well as for acquisition of other external knowledge; regarding 
national funding, these are the models for aggregate cooperation, cooperation with customers, 
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with suppliers, with consultants and with HEIs as well as for outsourcing of R&D and 
acquiring other external knowledge. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
For a robustness check, following Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008), we restricted the 
sample to those firms that reported positive intramural R&D expenditures, which enables us 
to focus on innovative firms. The estimated treatment effects are consistent with those 
reported for the whole sample, although slightly increased.
 
Furthermore, subsequent 
sensitivity analysis indicates that six models from this sub-sample are robust to hidden bias, 
compared to five models for the whole sample.
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5 Conclusions 
Our study reports a positive, but heterogeneous impact of public support on open 
innovation in Spanish SMEs. However, sensitivity analysis suggests that many of the 
programme effects could be overestimated due to unobserved heterogeneity, which matching 
estimators cannot account for. Notably, the results for two cooperative partners - cooperation 
with suppliers and with HEIs - seem to be highly sensitive to hidden bias. This is not to say 
that there is an issue of unobserved heterogeneity from the perspective of either suppliers or 
HEIs. On the contrary, through cooperative networking, they may obtain all the necessary 
information about the firm. The issue of hidden bias is associated with unobserved firm 
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 We do not report the results for the subsample of innovative firms, but they are available on request. Six 
robust treatment effects are found: for innovative firms funded by regional support programmes - aggregate 
cooperation, cooperation with government agencies, and outsourcing R&D; and for innovative firms funded by 
national support programmes, robust treatment effects are estimated for cooperation with competitors, 
cooperation with government agencies, and outsourcing R&D. 
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characteristics, such as managerial abilities and attitudes, which are generally inaccessible to 
researchers.  
Our general conclusion from the Rosenbaum bound approach that matching estimates of 
the effects of public support are likely be subject to hidden bias is consistent with Busom and 
Fernandez-Ribas (2008), who reach this conclusion by comparing estimates from matching 
and bivariate probit estimation. However, the particular estimates most subject to hidden bias 
are difficult to compare, because Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008) investigate more 
aggregate categories. For example, Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008) find pronounced 
hidden bias in estimates of the effectiveness of public support for private-public partnerships 
in general, whereas we find hidden bias for estimates of the effects on cooperation with HEIs 
but not for estimates of the effects on cooperation with government institutions; similarly, 
Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008) do not find hidden bias in estimates of the effectiveness 
of public support on vertical cooperation, whereas we find uniform evidence for hidden bias 
in the estimated effects on cooperation with suppliers but mixed evidence with respect to 
effects on cooperation with customers. We conclude that while hidden bias may be endemic 
in matching studies, there is no evidence that hidden bias is consistent across different studies 
of the effectiveness of public support on cooperation. A corollary is the usefulness of 
investigating the effects of public support for different types of cooperative partners 
separately, in which we depart from some previous studies (e.g. Fier et al. 2006; Busom and 
Fernandez-Ribas, 2008; Spithoven et al., 2012, p.171 and p. 181). Similar reasoning leads us 
also to the usefulness of investigating the effects of support from different levels of 
government separately (Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2008). A similar conclusion is 
advanced by Spithoven et al. (2012, p. 170), who investigated network additionality in 
Belgian firms and found that “there are, indeed, substantial differences in impact between 
different types of funding”. 
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Given the lack of sensitivity analysis in empirical studies, empirical evidence from 
matching studies should be treated with caution. The issue of unobserved heterogeneity is 
further exacerbated by the absence of valid instruments in available datasets (prominently the 
CIS data), which precludes researchers from applying other evaluation methods, not only as a 
robustness check but also as a way of controlling for selection on unobserved firm 
characteristics. In the absence of a robustness check in this context, the importance of a 
sensitivity analysis is even more pronounced. 
Taking into account the results of sensitivity analysis, we proceed with the concluding 
remarks. In total, 18 treatment effects were estimated from the whole sample and the same 
number from the subsample of innovative SMEs. Five estimated effects in the whole sample 
are rather robust to selection bias; and six estimates in the subsample (perhaps due to a more 
homogenous sample). In total, out of 36 treatment effects, only 11 are not likely to be 
overestimated. Finally, across both the whole sample and the subsample of innovative firms, 
five ATT effects are robust to hidden bias:  
 For local/regional support, three effects on the following open innovation activities - 
aggregate cooperation, cooperation with government institutions, and outsourcing 
R&D; 
 For national (government) support, two effects - on horizontal cooperation and 
cooperation with government institutions. 
Overall, we find that public support most robustly increases SME cooperation with 
government institutions; only slightly less robust is that the largest treatment effects of public 
support - both regional (a robust finding) and federal (borderline robust) - are for outsourcing 
R&D activities. Yet there is not so much robust evidence that public support increases 
cooperative and innovative behaviour more generally. Recent work on cooperation failure 
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can help us to make sense of this contrast, suggesting that it may be of systematic rather than 
merely contingent significance. 
By analysing treatment effects of different types of inbound open innovations, our study 
discriminates between the effects of public intervention on cooperation for innovation and on 
R&D and innovation outsourcing (extramural R&D investments and acquiring other external 
knowledge). Our results suggest that, depending on the source of funding, SMEs are more 
likely to respond to public support by increasing either their cooperation with government 
institutions or their investment in extramural R&D than by establishing and maintaining 
cooperative networks. Following our discussion in Section 2, acquiring external knowledge 
through cooperation could be subject to cooperation failure. In this case, compared to 
cooperation with other firms, either  increased cooperation with government institutions may 
be facilitated by greater trust that these are unlikely to appropriate the firm’s intellectual 
property; or/and R&D subcontracting is a more viable option. This issue deserves further 
attention  from both practitioners and policy-makers.  For example, to increase the 
effectiveness of public support for cooperation between firms – including customers and 
suppliers – policy makers should place particular emphasis on measures designed to attenuate 
cooperation failures (Zeng et al., 2010). 
Empirical investigation into behavioural additionality is still in its nascent years. Our 
study is the first to investigate the impact of public innovation measures on open innovation 
practices other than cooperative behaviour. However, available data does not allow for 
assessing the effectiveness of public support on other categories of firms' behaviour, such as 
changes in managers' competencies and expertise (Busom and Fernandez-Ribas, 2008; Fier et 
al., 2006). Moreover, the effectiveness of public support on outbound open innovation (such 
as venturing or outward licensing of IPs) could also be a subject of future research. And 
finally, the absence of longitudinal data continues to inhibit the exploration of medium-to-
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long-run effects of programme participation on cooperative behaviour (Busom and 
Fernandez-Ribas, 2008). 
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Tables 
 
 
Table A.1: Variable definition, mean and standard deviation of dependent and independent variables 
Variable Variable definition Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
FUNLOC DV=1 if a firm received local/regional support; 0 otherwise; 0.231 0.422 
FUNGMT DV=1 if a firm received government support; 0 otherwise; 0.164 0.370 
COOPERATION  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with suppliers, customers, competitors, consultants, universities and 
government; 0 otherwise; 
0.222 0.416 
COOP_CUSTOMERS DV=1 if a firm cooperates with customers; 0 otherwise; 0.061 0.240 
COOP_SUPPLIERS  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with suppliers; 0 otherwise; 0.107 0.309 
COOP_COMPETITORS DV=1 if a firm cooperates with competitors; 0 otherwise; 0.036 0.187 
COOP_CONSULTANTS  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes; 0 
otherwise; 
0.057 0.232 
COOP_HEI DV=1 if a firm cooperates with universities or other Higher Education Institutions (HEI); 0 
otherwise; 
0.070 0.255 
COOP_GOVERNMENT  DV=1 if a firm cooperates with government or public research institutes; 0 otherwise; 0.088 0.284 
OUTSOURCING_RD DV=1 if a firm conducts extramural R&D; 0 otherwise; 0.247 0.431 
EXTERNAL_KNOWLEDGE DV=1 if a firm purchases or licenses patents, know -how and other types of knowledge from other 
firms; 0 otherwise;  
0.025 0.157 
SMALL_FIRMS  DV=1 if a firm has between 10 and 50 employees; 0.638 0.481 
BARRIER3 Importance of too high innovation costs as a barrier to innovation (score between 0- no 
importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.842 1.090 
BARRIER4 Importance of lack of qualified personnel as a barrier to innovation (score between 0- no 
importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.441 1.006 
BARRIER7  Importance of difficulties in finding cooperative partners as a barrier to innovation (score between 
0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.996 1.041 
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PROPAT DV=1 if a firm applied for a patent; zero otherwise; 0.113 0.316 
CONTINOUS_RD DV=1 if a firm continuously perform R&D activities during 2004-2006; 0 otherwise; 0.345 0.475 
GP DV=1 if a firm belongs to enterprise group; zero otherwise; 0.258 0.438 
EXPORT  DV=1 if a firm is exporter; zero otherwise; 0.686 0.464 
INCOMING1 Importance of following sources of information: conferences, trade fairs and exhibitions (score 
between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.051 1.041 
INCOMING2 Importance of following sources of information: scientific journals and publications (score 
between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.861 0.930 
INCOMING3 Importance of following sources of information: professional and industry associations (score 
between 0- no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.688 0.867 
INFO_INTERNAL  Importance of the information generated within the firm or enterprise group (score between 0- 
no importance; 1 - low importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
2.135 1.006 
INFO_CUSTOMERS Importance of customers as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.363 1.145 
INFO_SUPPLIERS  Importance of suppliers as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.541 1.102 
INFO_COMPETITORS Importance of competitors as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
1.059 1.034 
INFO_CONSULTANTS  Importance of consultants as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.791 0.977 
INFO_HEI Importance of HEIs as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.515 0.851 
INFO_GOVERNMENT Importance of government as a source of information (score between 0- no importance; 1 - low 
importance; 2 -medium importance; and 3 -high importance); 
0.348 0.667 
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Table A.2. Cooperation and programme participation in regional and government support programmes (N=8,022) 
 
Cooperation Outsourcing R&D 
Acquisition of other 
external knowledge 
Regional support Yes No Yes  No  Yes  No  
Yes 
711 
(8.9 %) 
1,071 
(13.4 %) 
809 
(10.1 %) 
1,045 
(13.0 %) 
63 
(0.8 %) 
1,791 
(22.3 %) 
No 
1,143 
(14.2 %) 
5,097 
(63.5 %) 
1,171 
(14.6 %) 
4,997 
(62.3 %) 
141 
(1.8 %) 
6,027 
(75.1 %) 
Government (national) 
support 
      
Yes 
493 
(6.1 %) 
819 
(10.2 %) 
570 
(7.1 %) 
742 
(9.2 %) 
54 
(0.7 %) 
1,258 
(15.7 %) 
No 
1,289 
(16.1 %) 
5,421 
(67.6 %) 
1,410 
(17.6 %) 
5,300 
(66.1 %) 
150 
(1.9 %) 
6,560 
(81.7 %) 
Note: For each stream of funding and each type of open innovation (cooperation, outsourcing R&D and acquisition of other external 
knowledge), the percentage total constitutes 100.  
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Table 1: Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATTs) of two sources of funding   
Dependent 
variable 
Regional support  Government support 
NN matching 
with Mahalanobis 
metric and caliper 
0.02 
Kernel 
matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, 
bw=0.06) 
IPWT 
estimator  
NN matching 
with 
Mahalanobis 
metric and 
caliper 0.02 
Kernel matching 
(Epanechnikov 
kernel, bw=0.06) 
IPWT estimator 
ATT 
(sub-sampled SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT 
(robust SEs) 
ATT 
(sub-sampled 
SEs) 
ATT 
(bootstrapped 
SEs) 
ATT 
(robust SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation  
0.157*** 
(0.020) 
0.141*** 
(0.014) 
0.142*** 
(0.014) 
0.099*** 
(0.026) 
0.085*** 
(0.014) 
0.089*** 
(0.016) 
Cooperation with 
customers 
0.054*** 
(0.012) 
0.053*** 
(0.009) 
0.054*** 
(0.009) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
0.047*** 
(0.016) 
0.039*** 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.040** 
(0.020) 
0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
Cooperation with 
competitors 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.045*** 
(0.013) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
Cooperation with 
consultants  
0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.034** 
(0.017) 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.030*** 
(0.010) 
Cooperation with 
HEI 
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
0.042*** 
(0.010) 
0.044*** 
(0.010) 
0.032* 
(0.019) 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
0.051*** 
(0.012) 
Cooperation with 
government  
0.115*** 
(0.014) 
0.118*** 
(0.012) 
0.117*** 
(0.011) 
0.069*** 
(0.019) 
0.084*** 
(0.012) 
0.086*** 
(0.013) 
Outsourcing R&D  0.163*** 
(0.020) 
0.168*** 
(0.013) 
0.167*** 
(0.014) 
0.117*** 
(0.025) 
0.122*** 
(0.013) 
0.124*** 
(0.016) 
Acquisition of 
other external 
knowledge 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
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Table 2: Balancing tests after matching for NN and kernel matching  
Matching estimators 
Regional support  
Pseudo-R2 
p-value of 
LR test 
Mean 
bias 
t-test 
NN matching without replacement  and 
caliper  
0.002 1.000 1.8 Yes 
NN matching with Mahalanobis metric 
and caliper   
0.001 1.000 0.8 Yes 
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel) 
 
0.000 1.000 0.9 Yes 
 Government support 
NN matching without replacement  and 
caliper  
0.004 0.999 2.0 Yes 
NN matching with Mahalanobis metric 
and caliper   
0.004 0.996 1.5 
No at the 5% level 
of significance  
Kernel matching (Epanechnikov kernel) 
 
0.001 1.000 1.7 Yes 
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Table 3: Sensitivity analysis - Rosenbaum bound approach   
Open 
innovation 
strategies  
Regional support Government support 
NN without replacement 
and caliper 0.02 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation)b 
NN without replacement and 
caliper 0.02 
Hidden bias at  
5 % 
(overestimation) ATT (subsampled SEs)a ATT (subsampled SEs) 
Aggregate 
cooperation 
0.135*** 
(0.016) 
No when Γ≤1.70 
0.079*** 
(0.020) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
Cooperation with 
customers 
0.047*** 
(0.010) 
Yes when Γ≥1.50 
0.042*** 
(0.014) 
Yes when Γ≥1.35 
Cooperation with 
suppliers 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
 
0.022 
(0.015) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.45 changes sign 
Cooperation with 
competitors 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
Yes when Γ≥1.35 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
No when Γ≤1.85 
Cooperation with 
consultants 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
Yes when Γ≥1.25 
0.023 
(0.014) 
Yes when Γ≥1.05 
At Γ≥1.65 changes sign 
Cooperation with 
HEI 
0.043*** 
(0.011) 
Yes when Γ≥1.35 
0.039* 
(0.015) 
Yes when Γ≥1.15 
Cooperation with 
government 
0.110*** 
(0.012) 
No when Γ≤2.00 
0.086*** 
(0.016) 
No when Γ≤1.65 
Outsourcing R&D 
0.169*** 
(0.017) 
No when Γ≤1.90 
0.112*** 
(0.018) 
Yes when Γ≥1.45 
At Γ≥1.90 changes sign 
Acquisition of 
other external 
knowledge 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
At Γ≥1.85 changes sign
c
 
0.012 
(0.008) 
Yes when Γ≥1.00 
Notes: 
a 
*** ATT estimated at the one per cent level of significance; ** ATT estimated at the five per cent level of significance; * ATT estimated at the ten per cent level of 
significance. 
b
 Interpretation as follows: for example, in the case of “No when Γ≤1.70”, the upper bound is not significant at the 5 per cent level when Γ is below or equal to 
1.7 (so Γ at the threshold level of 1.5 is not statistically significant, meaning that the reported ATT effect would be sensitive only to very high levels of unobserved 
heterogeneity and that, hence, we can reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect); “Yes when Γ≥1.50” means that the upper bound becomes significant at the 5 per 
cent level when Γ is 1.5 (so Γ at the threshold level of 1.5 is statistically significant, meaning that the reported ATT effect would be sensitive to relatively low levels of 
unobserved heterogeneity and that, hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect); and  “Yes when Γ≥1.25” means that the upper bound becomes 
significant at the 5 per cent level when Γ exceeds 1.25 (so Γ at the threshold level of 1.5 is statistically significant). 
c
 Interpretation as follows: In five of the 27 cases reported 
in Table 3 not only is the effect of unobserved heterogeneity such that an estimated positive ATT effect can never be  statistically significant at the five per cent level, but 
also that at very high levels the estimated ATT effect may become significantly negative.  
